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STATE CONTROL OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
One of the most frequently repeated of famous obiter dicta is
that of Chief Justice Taney in the case of Bank of Augusta v.
Earle."
"It is very true, that a corporation can have no legal existence
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.
It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law;
and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory,
the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place
of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."
This statement was purely obiter, for the decision, which
upheld the validity of a purchase in Alabama by the agents of
certain corporations of other States of bills of exchange drawn
there upon payees in New York, did not necessarily involve an
affirmance or denial of the power of foreign corporations to
migrate, but merely of their capacity to empower agents to make
purchases for them outside the States of their creation. On
this point the Chief justice said:
"Now, natural persons, through the intervention of agents,
are continually making contracts in countries in which they do
not reside; and where they are not personally present when the
contract is made; and nobody has ever doubted the validity of
these agreements. And what greater objection can there be to
the capacity of an artificial person, by its agents, to make a
contract, within the scope of its limited powers,.in a sovereignty
in which it does not reside, provided such contracts are per-
mitted to be made by them by the laws of the place ?"
The discussion then ran on to the question whether or not by
the comity of nations, and between the States, corporations of
1 i Peters, 5z9-589.
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one State were permitted to make contracts in another, and it
was noted in passing that "in England, from which we have
received our general principles of jurisprudence, no doubt ap-
pears to have been entertained of the right of a foreign cor-
poration to sue in its courts," and that "it has been decided in
many of the State courts, we believe in all of them where the
question has arisen, that a corporation of one State may sue in
the courts of another." 2
In the argument at the bar, Mr. Webster said:
"My learned friend says, indeed, that suing and making a
contract are different things. True; but this argument, so far
as it has any force, makes against his cause; for it is a much
more distinct exercise of corporate power to bring a suit, than
by an agent to make a purchase. What does the law take to be
true, when it says that a corporation of one State may sue in
another? Why, that the corporation is there, in court, ready to
submit to the court's decree, a party on its record. . .
"The truth is, that this argument against the power of a cor-
poration to do acts beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
authority by which it is created is refuted by all history as well
as by plain reason.
"What have all the great corporations in England been doing
for centuries back? The English East India Company, as far
back as the reign of Elizabeth, has been trading all over the
Eastern world. That company traded in Asia, before Great
Britain had established any territorial government there, and in
the other parts of the world, where England never pretended to
any territorial authority. The Bank of England, established in
1694, has been always trading and dealing in exchanges and
bullion with Hamburg, Amsterdam and other marts of Europe.
Numerous other corporations have been created in England, for
the purpose of exercising power over matters and things, in
territories wherein the power of England has never been exerted.
The whole commercial world is full of such corporations, exer-
cising similar powers, beyond the territorial jurisdiction within
which they have legal existence."
The Chief justice yielded to this argument. "We think it is
well settled." he wrote, "that by the law of comity among nations,
a corporation created by one sovereignty is permitted to make
contracts in another and to sue in its courts; and that the same
law of comity prevails among the several sovereignties of this
Union."
This conclusion demonstrated, as Mr. Webster pointed out,
the fallacy of the proposition that a corporation can have no
2 13 Peters, 590.
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existence beyond the limits of the State where it is organized,
and the recognition of such existence has been almost universal
from the date of that decision to the present time.
In an early case in New York, the highest court of that State
recognized and affirmed the right of its citizens to go into an
adjoining State and there procure a charter for the express pur-
pose of carrying on business in the State of their residence; and
the right of a State to grant to persons within its jurisdiction
a corporate character and capacity to be exercised either within
or without its territorial bounds was asserted. "It cannot en-
large its own jurisdiction," said the court, "but it can confer
general powers to be exercised within its bounds, or beyond
them, wherever the comity of nations is respected. For the pur-
poses of commerce such a commission is regarded like a govern-
ment flag, as a symbol of allegiance and authority; and it is
entitled to recognition abroad until it forfeits recognition at
home." 3
The migrating tendencies and powers of corporations were
recognized in Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard,4 where Chief
justice Waite, after repeating the dictum from Bank of Augusta
.v. Earle, that "a corporation 'must dwell in the place of its crea-
tion, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty,'" proceeded to
demonstrate its inaccuracy by adding, "though it may do busi-
ness in all places where its charter allows and the local laws do
not forbid.5 But wherever it goes for business it carries its
charter, as that is the law of its existence,6 and the charter is the
same abroad that it is at home. Whatever disabilities are placed
upon the corporation at home it retains abroad, and whatever
legislative control it is subjected to at home must be recognized
and submitted to by those who deal with it elsewhere. A cor-
poration of one country may be excluded from business in an-
other country,' but, if admitted, it must, in the absence of legis-
lation equivalent to making it a corporation of the latter country,
be taken, both by the government and those who deal with it, as
a creature of the law of its own country, and subject to all the
legislative control and direction that may be properly exercised
over it at the place of its creation."
$ Merrick v. Van Sanford, 34 N. Y., 208.
4 109 U. S., 527-537.
bRailroad v. Koontz, 104 U. S., 12.
9 Relf v. Rundel, io3 U. S., 226.
'Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., i68.
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In the case of Adams Express Company v. Ohio,8 on a peti-
tion for a reargument of the cases involving taxation of express
companies,9 Mr. Justice Brewer, delivering the opinion of the
court, said:
"It may be true that the principal office of the corporation is
in New York, and that for certain purposes the maxim of the
common law was 'mobilia personam sequuntur; but that maxim
was never of universal application and seldom interfered with
the right of taxation. . . . It is also true that a corporation
is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the Federal courts, conclusively
presumed to be a citizen of the State which created it, but it does
not follow therefrom that its franchise to be is for all purposes
to be regarded as confined to that State. For the transaction of
its business it goes into various States, and wherever it goes as
a corporation it carries with it that franchise to be. But the
franchise to be is only one of the franchises of a corporation.
The franchise to do is an independent franchise, or rather a com-
bination of franchises embracing all things which the corporation
is given power to do, and this power to do is as much a thing of
value and a part of the intangible property of the corporation as
the franchise to be. Franchises to do go wherever the work is
done."
It was accordingly held in that case, that, in determining the
value of that proportion of the capital of the Adams Express
Company, organized in New York, which was employed in busi-
ness in Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky, respectively, it was lawful
to include not merely the tangible value of the property, but that
proportion of the intangible property which the value of the
tangible property in one State bore to the aggregate of the tangi-
ble property in all the States.
The legislatures of almost all the States have enacted regula-
tions based on a recognition of the power of corporations to
migrate and establish and conduct their business in States other
than that in which they are incorporated. Not very long after
the decision in Bank of Augusta against Earle, the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with a case where a corporation
of Indiana had assumed to migrate from that sovereignty to
Ohio, and an action was brought in the latter State to recover
upon a contract made by the corporation within that State, pro-
cess being served upon an agent of the corporation then within
that State, on which judgment was entered against the company.
In an action against the corporation on such judgment in the
8 i66 U. S., x85.
Reported i65 U. S., 255.
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United States Court within the State by which defendant was in-
corporated, the judgment sued on was challenged upon the
ground that no jurisdiction over the corporation could be obtained
by service of process on it in Ohio.
The court said that while the corporation, existing only by
virtue of a law of Indiana, could not be deemed to pass per-
sonally beyond the limits of tfiat State, it could submit itself to
the jurisdiction of that State by appointing an attorney to appear
there; and it was held on the facts of the case, that by entering
into the State of Ohio and transacting business under its laws.
the corporation had in effect, consented to be sued in that State."0
Mr. Justice Curtis, writing the opinion of the court, said:
"A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in
Ohio only with the consent, express or implied, of the latterState." This consent may be accompanied by such conditions as
Ohio may think fit to impose; and these conditions must be
deemed valid and effectual by other States, and by this court, pro-
vided they are not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law
which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from
encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice
which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defense."
Corporations continued to migrate, and to an increasing de-
gree the business of the country was conducted through associa-
tion in corporate form. The States availing of the right pointed
out in the Bank of Augusta case, enacted legislation modifying
and regulating the comity by virtue of which corporations were
permitted to do business in foreign States, and in the case of
Paul against Virginia (8 Wall., I68), there was squarely pre-
sented to the Supreme Court the question whether or not there
were any limitations upon the power of a State to regulate the
transaction of business within its jurisdiction by corporations
organized under the laws of other sovereignties. The court held
that, as a corporation of one State had no absolute right of rec-
ognition in other States, but depended for such recognition and
the enforcement of its contracts on their assent, it followed that
such assent might be granted upon such terms and conditions as
those States might think proper to impose. "They may exclude
the foreign corporation entirely," said Mr. Justice Field, in de-
livering the unanimous opinion of the court, "they may restrict
its business to particular localities, or they may exact such se-
'
0 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, i8 How., 404, 407.
"' 13 Pet., Sig.
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curity for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as,
in their judgment, will best promote the public interests. The
whole matter rests in their discretion."
The contention was made that the statute of Virginia under
consideration in that case regulating the character of corporations
which should be allowed to carry on business in the State of
Virginia, was in conflict with that clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be en-
titled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States;" but the answer was made that corporations are not
citizens within the meaning of that provision. "The term citizens.
as there used applies only to natural persons, members of the
body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial per-
sons created by the legislature and possessing only the attributes
which the legislature has prescribed."
This decision has been uniformly followed by the Supreme
Court, and has been very recently reaffirmed in the case of Ham-
mond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,"2 where the court upheld, as ap-
plicable to and binding upon a foreign corporation theretofore
licensed to do business in Arkansas, a statute of Arkansas which
made it a crime for any corporation, foreign, or domestic, to be-
come a member of or party to any pool, trust, agreement, com-
bination, or understanding, made within the State or elsewhere,
to regulate or fix, either within the State or elsewhere, the price
of any commodity within the State or elsewhere; or to become a
member of or party to, any agreement, contract, combination, or
association made within the State or elsewhere, to fix or limit,
either within the State or elsewhere, the amount or quantity of
any article of manufacture, etc. Mr. Justice White, in delivering
the unanimous opinion of the court, said:
"As the State possessed the plenary power to exclude a foreign
corporation from doing business within its borders, it follows that
if the State exerted such unquestioned power from a consider-
ation of acts done in another jurisdiction, the motive for the
exertion of the lawful power did not operate to destroy the right
to call the power into play. This being true, it follows that, as the
power of the State to prevent a foreign, corporation from con-
tinuing to do business is but the correlative of its authority to
prevent such corporation from coming into the State, unless by
the act of admission some contract right in favor of the cor-
poration arose, . . . it follows that the prohibition against
continuing to do business in the State because of acts done be-
12212 U. S., 322.
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yond the State was none the less a valid exertion of power as to a
subject within the jurisdiction of the State."
The unlimited extent of the power of the States recognized
by the Supreme Court is strikingly illustrated by the decision in
the case of Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt,"3
where the constitutionality of a statute of Kentucky was up-
held which enacted that, before authority is granted to any for-
eign insurance company to do business in the State, it must file
with the commissioner, a resolution of its directors consenting
that service of process upon any agent of the company within
the State or upon the commissioner of insurance, in any action
brought or pending in the State, shall be a valid service upon the
company; but if the company should, without the consent of the
other party to any suit brought by or against it in any court of
the State, remove the same to any Federal Court, or institute any
suit or proceeding against any citizen of Kentucky in any Federal
Court, it should be the duty of the commissioner to forthwith re-
voke all authority to such company to do business within the
State. The court had previously held that a statute requiring a
foreign corporation, as a condition to obtaining a license to do
business within the State, to stipulate in writing that it would not
remove into the Federal courts any suits brought against it in
the State courts was void, because it made the right to do busi-
ness under the license or contract depend upon the surrender by
the corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution."4
But such ruling was distinguished by the court upon the ground
that, while a State might not require a corporation to so stipu-
late in advance, it was perfectly constitutional for it to enact that
if a foreign corporation did remove a case into the Federal Court
or bring a suit there, its license should be revoked. The result
of this decision is to enable a State to compel a foreign corpor-
ation to refrain from resorting to the Federal Courts in controver-
sies brought by or against it, or else to cease to do business with-
in that State, that is, to make its continuance within a State
depend upon the practical surrender of a right which the Supreme
Court itself had declared was secured to it by the Constitution.
13 200 U. S., 446; also 202 U. S., 246.
14 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall., 455; Doyle v. Continental Ins.
Co., 94 U. S., 535; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S., 181; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Denton, r46 U. S., 202-7; Barrow v. Kane, 170 U. S., ioo; Blake v.
McClung, 172 U. S., 239-255.
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Not only has the Supreme Court held that corporations are
not citizens within the provisions of Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution, which secure to the citizens of each State "the
rights, privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,"
but it has also held that they are not "citizens" within that pro-
vision of Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution which declares that "no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States." I- The court has, however, held them to
be "persons" within those provisions of the same section of the
Fourteenth Amendment which declare that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law," 16 nor "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 11 The equal protection of the laws
which corporations may claim is, however, only such as is ac-
corded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the
State18 Corporations are, of course, also entitled to the benefit
of the provisions of Section io of Article I of the Constitution,
which prohibit a State from passing any law impairing the
obligation of contracts. This section furnished the basis for the
decision in American Smelting and Refining Company v.
Colorado,19 where it was held that although a State may impose
different liabilities on foreign than those imposed on domestic
corporations, a statute requiring foreign corporations to pay a
fee based on their capital stock for the privilege of entering the
State and doing business therein and thereupon to be subjected
to all liabilities and restrictions of domestic corporations, amounts
to a contract with foreign corporations complying therewith that
they will not be subjected during the period for which they are
admitted to greater liabilities than those imposed upon domestic
corporations, and that a subsequent statute imposing higher
annual license fees on foreign, than on domestic, corporations for
the privilege of continuing to do business, is void as impairing
the obligation of such contract, as respects those corporations
which have paid the entrance tax and received permits to do busi-
15Norfolk, etc., Railroad Co. v. Pcnn., 136 U. S., 114-118; Paul V.
Virginia, 8 Wall., 168.
I Minn. Railway Co. v. Beckwith, .129 U. S., 268.
IT Smythe v. Ames, 169 U. S., 468.
18 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S., 181-188; Santa
Clara v. Southern Pacific, 1I8 U. S., 394-6.
'9 2o4 U. S., 103.
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ness; and that the tax could not be justified under the power to
alter, amend and repeal reserved by the State Constitution (of
Colorado). But the effect of this decision was greatly restricted
by that in Hammond Packing Company v. Arkansas,20 where it
was held that, as the Constitution of Arkansas authorized foreign
corporations to do business in that State subject to the same
regulations and with the same rights as those enjoyed by do-
mestic corporations, and the statutes of the State authorized
permits to be issued to foreign corporations, subjecting them to
the same privileges as domestic corporations on payment of the
same fees and on compliance with similar statutory requirements,
and the Constitution reserved to the legislature power to repeal,
alter or amend charters of incorporation "provided no injustice
shall be done to the corporators," it was competent, without im-
pairing the obligation of the contract made with it by the State
in admitting it to do business, to enact a statute to prevent all
foreign corporations from doing business in Arkansas if they
should be members of a trust, combination or conspiracy against
trade, whether such trust, pool, combination or conspiracy should
effect or was intended to effect prices or rates in Arkansas or not.
"By the Constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas," said
Mr. Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the court, "it is
said foreign corporations, when lawfully admitted to do business
in the State, were entitled to rights equal to those enjoyed by
domestic corporations. . . . The chartered right to do a
particular business did not operate to deprive the State of its
lawful police authority, and therefore the franchise to do the
business was inherently qualified by the duty to execute the char-
ter powers conformably to such reasonable police regulations as
might thereafter be adopted in the interests of the public welfare.
Besides, it is not disputed that the State under its Constitution
had a reserved power to repeal, alter and amend charters by it
granted, and therefore, even if the impossible assumption was in-
dulged that the grant of the power to do business implied in the
absence of such reservation the right to carry on the business in
violation of a lawfully regulating statute, the existence of a re-
serve power leaves no semblance of ground for the proposition.
The claim of an irrepealable contract cannot be predicated upon
a contract which is repealable. . . The determination
whether the power to repeal, alter or amend was exerted in such
20 212 U. S., 322-344.
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a manner as to be unjust to incorporators, was within the pro-
vince of the State court to finally decide, unless that power was
exerted in such an arbitrary manner as, irrespective of the con-
tract laws, to deprive of some other and fundamental right which
was within the protection of the Constitution of the United
States."
As a result of the decisions referred to it may be safely asserted
that the only limitation upon the powers of the States to exclude
foreign corporations entirely from doing business within their
territory, or to prescribe such conditions as they may deem proper
to the carrying on by them of such business, are, first, that the
regulations so prescribed shall not deprive the foreign cor-
porations of property without due process of law, or deny to them
the equal protection of the laws; and, secondly, that such regula-
tions shall not amount to an interference with interstate com-
merce, or with other business of a Federal nature.
In Hooper v. California,2 1 Mr. Justice White said:
"The principle that the right of a foreign corporation to en-
gage in business within a State other than that of its creation,
depends solely upon the will of such other State, has been long
settled. . . . Whilst there are exceptions to this rule they
embrace only cases where a corporation created by one State rests
its right to enter another and to engage in business therein upon
the Federal nature of its business. As, for instance, where it has
derived its being from an act of Congress and has become a
lawful agency for the performance of governmental or quasi-
governmental functions, or where it is necessarily an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or its business constitutes such
commerce and is, therefore, solely within the paramount authority
of Congress. In these cases the exceptional business is pro-
tected against interference by State authority."
In general almost all of the States require foreign corporations
to file in an appropriate office copies of their charters and to
designate a local agent on whom process may be served. A
number of the States require a license to be procured upon com-
pliance with more or less simple requirements, and a license fee
to be paid predicated upon the amount of capital to be employed
in business within the State. The Constitutions of California,
Kentucky, Montana, Utah, Washington and Oklahoma provide
that no foreign corporation shall be authorized to do business
within the State on more favorable conditions than domestic
corporations. Some of the States have restricted the power of
21 155 U. S., 648.
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foreign corporations to hold title to land within their borders;
thus, in Georgia, a foreign corporation can only own land in the
State to an amount not exceeding 5,ooo acres ;22 in Minnesota to
not more than 9o,ooo square feet, and in Mississippi to a value
of not exceeding $2,ooo,ooo. In Iowa a foreign corporation can
only hold real estate when acquired in satisfaction of a debt, and
must sell it within ten years. In Michigan a foreign corporation
cannot hold any land for more than ten years, except such as is
actually occupied by it in the exercise of its franchises. The
statutes of Missouri require a foreign corporation doing business
in that State to procure a license upon application filed with the
Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of its articles of asso-
ciation, "and if it shall appear that such company or corporation
could not organize under the laws of this State the license shall
be refused."
The laws of that State provide that a certificate of incor-
poration for a business corporation shall only be granted if the
entire capital stock specified in the articles of association shall be
subscribed, and one-half paid in in cash; and the courts of that
State have sustained the refusal by the State officials to grant
a license to a foreign corporation because its entire authorized
capital was not subscribed. The laws of Missouri further enact
that no foreign corporation organized by residents of Missouri
to evade the laws of that State shall be licensed to transact busi-
ness within the State, and a foreign corporation whose capital
stock exceeds $IO,OOOOOO may only obtain a license if the pro-
portion of its capital stock employed within the State shall not
exceed the capital which domestic corporations are permitted
to have.23
An annual franchise tax on a percentage basis, computed on
the full amount of the authorized capital stock, is imposed on
both foreign and domestic corporations alike by the laws of
Alabama, North Carolina and Vermont. A greater tax is im-
posed upon foreign than upon domestic corporations of the same
character in Colorado and Texas. Under a statute of Kansas,
requiring "every foreign corporation authorized by the Charter
Board to engage in business in this State" to "pay all the fees
required by this act to be paid by domestic corporations," the
Supreme Court of Kansas has held that a foreign corporation
22 Civil Code, Sec. 1849.
2 3 Laws i903, p. 121; I9O, p. z68.
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doing business in that State which increased its capital stock
from seven million to twelve million dollars was obliged to pay
a tax in Kansas upon the entire amount of such increase, irres-
pective of the question of what proportion of the increased capi-
tal was employed in business in the State of Kansas.'
In applying a statute taxing foreign corporations upon the
amount of capital employed by them within the State, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has held that a foreign railroad cor-
poration would be conclusively presumed to have employed in
business in that State at least the amount of its capital equal to
the minimum capital required of domestic railroad corporations. 52
A statute in Massachusetts provides that if a foreign corpora-
tion owns or controls a majority of the capital stock of a do-
mestic street railway, gas light, or electric light company, and
issues stock, bonds or other evidence of debt based on or secured
by the property, franchises or stock of a domestic corporation,
unless the issue be authorized by the laws of Massachusetts the
domestic corporation may be dissolved by the supreme judicial
court.
28
The Public Utilities Law of New York forbids any railroad
corporation, domestic or foreign, to acquire the stock of a domes-
tic railroad company or common carrier unless authorized by the
Public Service Commission, but enacts that no other kind of stock
corporation may acquire or hold more than ten per cent of the
total capital stock of any domestic railroad company or other
common carrier.27
These are only a few examples of particular provisions affect-
ing the right of foreign corporations to carry on business in the
States mentioned.
Much legislation has been enacted in various States for the
purpose of preventing trusts, pools and combinations in restraint
of trade and monopolies. Such was the law under consideration
in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.2 8 Many of these acts are
long, involved and abounding in adjectives. Some of them have
been more or less effective; most of them have proved ineffective
as applied to foreign corporations.
24 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Denton, 97 Pac. Rep., 439, rehearing, 99
Pac. Rep., 6oi.
25 State ex reL, R. R. Co. v. Cock, 121 Mo., 348.
26Laws i9o3,- Chap. 437, Sec. 64.
27Laws i9o7, Chap. 429, Sec. 54.
28 212 U. S.
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It has seemed to me that an effective method of legislating on
this subject would be to enact that no foreign corporation should
be licensed to do business within a State if fifty per centum of
its capital stock or upwards was owned or held by any other cor-
pbration, domestic or foreign, and that if, at any time after
obtaining such a license, more than fifty per centum of the
capital stock of such corporation should be acquired by another
corporation, the license should be ipso facto vacated. The device
of the holding corporation is the only thing which has made pos-
sible the rapid growth of the great trusts and monopolies, and a
prohibition such as that stated would go far towards their
destruction. Only companies which owned property, as dis-
tinguished from stock in other companies, could carry on intra-
state business within States other than that of their incorporation,
and very few of the great industrial corporations are directly
owners of all or even of the greater part of the property with
which they conduct their business. The increasing complexity
and variety of regulation and taxation of foreign corporations
by the various States in which their business is conducted, has
rendered it more and more burdensome and difficult for one cor-
poration to directly own and carry on business in a number of
different States. This has led to the organization of domestic
corporations under the laws of the respective States where busi-
ness is to be conducted, the capital stocks of which are held by
a "holding company" organized under the laws of that State,
whose legislation is most encouraging to such mode of organiza-
tion. Such is the organization of practically all of the best-
known "trusts." A system of disqualifying State legislation
such as suggested, while effective for the purpose, would in-
evitably increase the demand for Federal legislation authorizing
the organization of corporations under national law for the con-
duct of interstate business. Much protection from State inter-
ference and discriminatory regulation is already afforded to cor-
porations organized under State laws and engaged in inter-
state commerce. But more undisputed and clearly defined pro-
tection would be secured by national incorporation. In Pembina
Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania,29 the court said that the only limita-
tion upon the power of the State to exclude a foreign corporation
from doing business within its limits, or to exact conditions for
allowing it to do business there, arises when the corporation is
29 125 U. S., 181.
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in the employ of the Federal Government, or where its business
is strictly commerce, interstate or foreign; and the express com-
pany cases,30 the drummers' cases,3 ' and the telegraph cases, 2
are familiar instances of decisions by the Supreme Court holding
State legislation to be unconstitutional as interfering with the
Federal regulation of interstate commerce.
It would, indeed, be rash at this time to suggest a definition
of what constitutes interstate commerce. "Transactions between
manufacturing companies in one State, through agents, with
citizens of another, constitute a large part of interstate com-
merce" said the court in Caldwell v. North Carolina.3 3 "Com-
merce among the States," said Mr. Justice Harlan in the beef
case,3 4 "is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one.
drawn from the course of business ;" and it was there held that
when cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the
expectation that they would end their transit, after purchase, in
another, and when in effect they did so, with only the interruption
necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this was
a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing
was a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase
of the cattle was a part and incident of such commerce.
The business of the Danbury hat manufacturers, which was
held to be interstate commerce, in Loewe v. Lawlor, 5 was sum-
marized from the complaint by the court in the following
language:
"Plaintiffs were manufacturers of hats in Danbury, Connecti-
cut, having a factory there, and were then and there engaged in
an interstate trade in some twenty States other than the State of
Connecticut; that they were practically dependent upon such
interstate trade to consume the product of their factory, only a
small percentage of their entire output being consumed in the
State of Connecticut; that at the time the alleged combination
was formed they were in the process of manufacturing a large
number of hats for the purpose of fulfilling engagements then
actually made with consignees and wholesale dealers in States
other than Connecticut.
80 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47.
31 Norfolk &" Western Ry. v. Simrns, 191 U. S., 44; Rearick v. Penn.,
203 U. S., 507.32 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S., i.
33 187 U. S., 622-632.
34 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S., 375-398.
85 208 U. S., 274-304.
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These cases may be taken as suggestive of the extent of inter-
state trade or commerce now recognized to be within Federal
control.
The power of Congress to create corporations as a means to
the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the several
States has been affirmed in the case of a bank for the purpose of
carrying on the fiscal operations of the government; of a railroad
corporation for the purpose of promoting commerce among the
States; of the construction of public highways connecting several
States, either roads or.bridges.3 6
If, as the Supreme Court has directly adjudged, Congress has
authority, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce
among the several States, to authorize corporations to construct
railroads across the States as well as the Territories of the United
States, and the power to construct, or to authorize individuals or
corporations to construct, national highways and bridges from
State to State, why has it not necessarily full power to authorize
the formation of corporations to conduct other forms of inter-
state commerce, not merely transportation, but of that character
of interstate commerce dealt with in the Sherman anti-trust
law and described in the decisions in the Beef Trust and Danbury
Hat Case? Such corporations formed under national law would
not be foreign corporations in any of the States, and would
therefore be at liberty to transact their business without State
permission and free from State interference.
"The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the
several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction,
paramount sovereignty." 37
On this principle, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the Texas and Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation
organized by Act of Congress to construct a railroad from Mar-
shall, Texas, to San Diego, California, having its principal
administrative office within the State of Pennsylvania, was not a
foreign corporation in that State, and not affected by legislation
prohibiting a foreign corporation from carrying on business with-
in that State without first obtaining a license and paying a tax.
"The general government in its relation to that of the several
386McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316; Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat., 738; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, I5 U. S., I;
Indiana v. United States, 148 U. S., 148; Luxton v. North River Bridge
Co., 153 U. S., 525.
37 Bradley, J., in Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee, 3 Otto, 130-136.
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States," said the court, "cannot be considered a foreign govern-
ment in the ordinary acceptation of that term. Within the sphere
of its idelegated powers, its authority extends over all the States
of which it is composed, and to that extent it may be said to be
identified with the government of each. Hence, a corporation
created by the government of the United States cannot, with
propriety, be called a foreign corporation."
Of course, many will object to the centralizing tendency of a
national law authorizing the formation of corporations to carry
on interstate business; but such a law seems to me to be the in-
evitable result of economic conditions. The business of manu-
facture and sale, of barter and trade, is to-day conducted on such
a vast scale that it cannot be circumscribed by the boundaries
of any one State. On the other hand, no one State can effectively
grapple with abuses of the vast power which modern conditions
have placed in the hands of those who control great corporate
enterprises.
If, now, Congress shall enact a law providing for national
incorporation to carry on interstate commerce, subject to such
restrictions and with such freedom from local State control as
Congress shall see fit to prescribe, the State control of foreign
corporations, in all probability, will soon cease to be a subject of
great importance.
George W. Wickersham.
